Acceleration Clauses in Sales and Secured Transactions: The Debtor\u27s Burden under Section 1-208 of the U.C.C by Leaf, Frederick P
Boston College Law Review
Volume 11
Issue 3 Number 3 Article 8
3-1-1970
Acceleration Clauses in Sales and Secured
Transactions: The Debtor's Burden under Section
1-208 of the U.C.C
Frederick P. Leaf
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Secured Transactions Commons
This Uniform Commercial Code Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College
Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College
Law School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Frederick P. Leaf, Acceleration Clauses in Sales and Secured Transactions: The Debtor's Burden under




ACCELERATION CLAUSES IN SALES AND SECURED
TRANSACTIONS: THE DEBTOR'S BURDEN UNDER
SECTION 1-208 OF THE U.C.C.
Acceleration clauses are widely used in contracts involving sales on
credit and secured transactions. Although clauses which permit a cred,
itor to accelerate payment or to demand additional collateral when he
deems himself insecure or when the debtor defaults are necessary to
protect a creditor's collateral, the precipitous use of such clauses can
force a debtor into default and initiate a chain of similar accelerations
thus destroying viable contractual relationships. The drafters of the
Uniform Commercial Code,' in the light of the courts' experience under
both common law and prior uniform statutes, attempted to limit the
creditor's power under these clauses without unduly hindering his abil-
ity to protect the collateral. The Code established the test which the
creditor must meet in order to accelerate, and allocated the burden of
proof where the debtor claims that an acceleration was wrongful. 2
This comment will examine, compare and criticize the common law,
pre-Code statutes and Uniform Commercial Code treatment of acceler-
ation clauses in credit sales and secured transactions with respect to
the problems of when a creditor may lawfully accelerate, and what is
the proper allocation of the burden of proof.
I. ACCELERATION CLAUSES UNDER THE COMMON LAW
Under common law, acceleration clauses were categorized on the
basis of the occasion which gave rise to the creditor's right to acceler-
ate. One form of acceleration clause allowed the creditor to accelerate
when the debtor defaulted, and enumerated the instances or situations
that constituted default.' Although a default usually occurred upon a
non-payment of principal or interest,4 other reasons could be enumer-
1 All Uniform Commercial Code citations are to the 1962 ()facial Text.
2 U.C.C. 1-208 reads:
A term providing that one party or his successor in interest may accelerate
payment on performance or require a collateral or additional collateral "at will"
or "when he deems himself insecure" or in words of similar import shall be con-
strued to mean that he shall have power to do so only if he in good faith believes
that the prospect of payment or performance is impaired. The burden of estab-
lishing lack of good faith is on the party against whom the power has been
exercised.
a See, e.g., Harris v. Kessler, 124 Cal. App. 299, 12 P.2d 467 (Dist. Ct. App. 1932).
4
 2A G. Bogert, Uniform Laws Annotated § 101 (1924) [hereinafter cited as U.L.A.1.
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ated." A second form of acceleration clause allowed a creditor to
accelerate at will or when he deemed himself insecure.'
While the common law generally recognized acceleration clauses
as valid,' and found them to be neither a penalty nor a forfeiture but
rather an agreement as to when the debt shall be due,' the courts
placed two limitations upon them. First, the acceleration clause, al-
though not a penalty, would not be enforced where courts of equity
found that the creditor acted in bad faith, or the clause was uncon-
scionable.' Courts also limited clauses which provided that upon ac-
celeration the entire indebtedness became due, including the interest
for the full term of the contract. The courts generally held that even if
the contract was not usurious, the amount which the creditor received
as interest above the maximum statutory limit was uncollectable."
The courts reasoned that if the debtor by the terms of his contract
could avoid the payment of the larger, usurious sum by prompt per-
formance of his obligation, then the contract was not usurious, even
though recovery of any excess over the maximum legal interest rate
was generally disallowed as penal." The courts also looked to the
intent of the parties and not the form of the contract. If a penalty
5 Other grounds for acceleration under a default-type acceleration clause are cited in
Parks v. Hallett & Davis Piano Co., 145 'Ga. 671, 89 S.E. 715 (1916), where acceleration
occurred when the debtor sold the collateral; Morris v. Allen, 17 Cal. App. 684, 121 P.
690 (Dist. Ct. App. 1911), which allowed acceleration if the other creditors attached the
collateral of the debtor; Flint Wagon Works v. Maloney, 26 Del. 137, 81 A. 502 (1911),
where the acceleration occurred when the buyer suspended the operation of his business;
Huffard v. Akers, 52 W. Va. 21, 43 S.E. 124 (1902), where the seller could accelerate if
the buyer abused the collateral; Rathbun v. Waters, 1 City Ct. 36 (N.Y. City Marine Ct.
1876), where the seller could accelerate if the buyer failed to keep the goods insured;
Swain v. Schild, 66 Ind. App. 156, 117 N.E. 933 (1917), where the seller could accelerate
if the buyer lost possession or the goods were removed from his premises.
6 Call v. Seymour, 40 Ohio St. 670 (1884).
7
 Harris v. Kessler, 124 Cal. App. 299, 12 P.2d 467 (Dist. Ct. App. 1932); Heath v.
Randall, 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 195 (1849).
8
 124 Cal. App. at 302, 12 P.2d at 468.
9
 Graf v. Hope Bldg. Corp., 254 N.Y. 1, 171 N.E. 884 (1930). See also Annot,, 70
A.L.R. 993 (1931). This view is in line with the holding of the Graf decision. Justice
Cardozo, who dissented in Graf, desired to extend the majority's rule to situations where
the debtor's default was due to a trivial mistake or error on the part of the debtor and
where the creditor suffered no damage. He distinguished acceleration clauses as to their
effect on the creditor. A failure to pay taxes merely makes the creditor feel insecure but
failure to pay an interest installment makes the creditor lose money. He indicated that
while both clauses are valid, equity will not enforce the former where the failure to pay
taxes is due to the debtor's mistake or accident. See also Console v. Torchinsky, 97 Conn.
353, 116 A. 613 (1922).
10 6 S. Williston, Contracts § 1696 (rev. ed. 1938) ; Chicago Title & Trust Co. v.
Kearney, 282 Ill. App. 279 (1935). See also Restatement of Contracts § 536, Illustration
2 (1932).
11
 For a contrary view see Restatement of Contracts § 526, Illustration 5 (1932).
See also S. Williston, supra note 10, § 1696 n.2 for cases supporting this position. In
Shropshire v. Commerce Farm Credit Co., 120 Tex. 400, 30 S.W.2d 282 (1930), the court
held that where an acceleration clause makes due the principal plus all the interest for the
term, whether accrued or not, and this sum bears interest and total interest is above the
nominal statutory rate, the contract is void for illegality.
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was intended by using an acceleration clause to exact an interest rate
above the maximum statutory rate, then the clause was void."
The common law also regulated the operation of acceleration
clauses. Under common law the creditor had the burden of justifying
the acceleration.' If the acceleration clause was of the default variety,
the creditor had the burden of proving that the default in fact occurred,
and if the clause was of the insecurity type, the creditor had the
burden of proving that his insecure feeling was reasonable and that he
acted in good faith." The common law standard of good faith was
subjective." It required that the person acting do so honestly. This
standard was often referred to as the rule of "the pure heart and the
empty head.'"° With the default type acceleration clause the issue
of the creditor's good faith was not present since the creditor's right
to accelerate was initiated by the debtor. Although acceleration was al-
lowed when the creditor deemed himself insecure, his good faith
could be put in issue, and the debtor could defeat the creditor's right
to accelerate by proving that the creditor was motivated by factors
other than an insecure feeling about his collateral.'?
Depending on the wording of the acceleration clause, the courts
allowed the clause to operate either automatically or at the option
of the seller. If the clause was so worded as to be absolute in form,
leaving no option to either party, the courts were split as to whether
such a provision was self-executing and caused the whole debt to
become due automatically, or whether some further action by the seller
evidencing the exercise of his option was necessary." Jurisdictions
following the former rule generally proceeded on the theory that the
acceleration clause exists for the benefit of the buyer as well as the
seller, and that the courts may not make a new contract different from
the express intent of the parties." On the other hand, jurisdictions
following the latter, majority view reasoned that the clause is for the
benefit of the creditor, who should be free to decide whether such
protection is necessary under the circumstances of default.' If, how-
12
 Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Kearney, 282 III. App. 279, 286 (1935).
13 Leaf v. Reynolds, 34 Idaho 643, 652, 203 P. 458, 460 (1921) ; Spatuzzi v. Star
Auto Truck Exch., 119 N.J.L. 377, 196 A. 723 (Ct. Err. & App. 1938).
14 Jacksonville Tractor Co. v. Nasworthy, 114 So. 2d 463, 465 (Fla. 1959). See also
Hawyer v. Ball, 64 Hun 636, 19 N.Y.S. 612 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1892).
15 See lA A. Corbin, Contracts, § 165 (1963). See also Note, Good Faith Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 23 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 754 (1962).
10 Note, supra note 15, at 756.
Graf v. Hope Bldg. Corp., 254 N.Y. 1, 6, 171 N.E. 884, 885 (1930).
18
 Annot., 159 A.L.R. 1077 (1945). This annotation provides a complete discussion of
whether action by the creditor is required where there is an automatic acceleration
clause, an optional acceleration or a variant thereof. For an example of a case which
held that such an acceleration clause is self-executing, see Fischer v. Wood, 119 S.W.2d
114, 115 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938). For an example of a case holding that such clauses are
not self-executing, see Chase Nat'l Bank v. Burg, 32 F. Supp. 230, 232 (ID. Minn. 1940).
10 San Antonio Real Estate, Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Stewart, 94 Tex. 441, 446, 61
S.W. 386, 383 (1901) ; Snyder v. Miller, 71 Kan. 410, 411-12, 80 P. 970 (1905).
20
 Keene Five Cent Say. Bank v. Reid, 123 F. 221, 224 (8th Cir. 1903), cert. denied,
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ever, the clause provided that on default the total amount under the
contract would become due at the option of the seller, the courts uni,
formly held that such a clause was not self-executing and required
some action on the part of the seller." In reaching this decision the
courts either followed the express words of the clause, or reasoned
that the clause was for the benefit of the creditor who may take ad-
vantage of it at his discretion.' Based on this reasoning, insecurity
type acceleration clauses require the exercise of the creditor's option
to become operative.
Once the creditor had established his right to accelerate, the corn,
mon law determined the rights and duties of the creditor and debt9r.
The clause usually provided that the creditor had a right to the entire
amount due under the contract plus interest. 23 In order to recover this
amount, the common law rule on conditional sales required the creditor-
to elect between remedies to determine the manner of recovery 24
The creditor could exercise his right of possession under the theory
that title was reserved in him by the conditional sales contract,
or he could sue the debtor for the debt owed. 25
 Whichever election
the creditor made, it would act as a bar to the use of the other rem-
edy.26 This put the creditor in a difficult position, since he had the
choice of retaking his collateral and thus being barred from obtaining
a deficiency judgment, or proceeding against a possibly insolvent
debtor.
The debtor under common law could vest title in himself by pay-
ment of the balance due any time before repossession, 27 but once the
creditor had taken possession of the collateral the common law nor-
mally did not recognize the right to redeem the collateral by payment
or tender of either the amount in default or the full contract price.
There is some judicial support for an equitable right to redeem after
191 U.S. 567 (1903). For a modern decision using this reasoning, see Peter Fuller Enter,
prises, Inc. v. Manchester Say. Bank, 102 N.H. 117, 121, 152 A.2d 179 (1959), where the
buyer defaulted in order to make the debt due so as to pay the debt off immediately.
The court held that the clause was operative only upon the creditor's election.
21 Schumacher v. Miller, 111 Conn. 568, 571, 150 A. 524, 526 (1930); Annot., 159
A.L.R. 1077 (1945).
22 California Say. & Loan Soc'y v. Culver, 127 Cal. 107, 112,13, 59 P. 292, 294
(1899) ; Annot., 159 A.L.R. 1077 (1945).
23 E .g.,Harris v. Kessler, 124 Cal. App. 299, 300-01, 128 P.20 467 (Dist. Ct. App.
1932).
24 2 G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 43.1 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as Gilmore]. For an extensive treatment of the development of the common law
concept of chattel mortgages and its comparison to that of conditional sales and pledges,
see Gilmore § 43.2.
25 Id. § 43.2.
20 Id. § 43.1.
27
 Vaughan v. McFadyen, 110 Mich. 234, 235, 68 N.W. 135, 136 (1896).
2a Franklin Motor Car Co. v. Hamilton, 113 Me, 63, 65, 92 A. 1001, 1002 (1915).
There seems to be some support for the view that there is a right of redemption in the
area of chattel mortgages. See Bogert, The Evolution of the Conditional Sales Law in
New York, 8 Cornell L.Q. 303, 305 (1923).
534
ACCELERATION CLAUSES
repossession by a tender of the balance due upon default, hoWeVet
this right arose only when the acceleration Was due to some trivial de-
fault Or excusable negligence on the part of the debtor. 2° But if the con-
tract ihdicated that the parties did not contemplate the existence of
such a right,_ as where the acceleration clause contained the phrase,
"time is of the essence," the debtor lost even this equitable right:"
Thus, common law did not provide a satisfactory means for re,-
deeming collateral. It is Suggested that a short period during which
the debtor may redeem his collateral after repossession, by payment of
the amount by which he is in default, would protect the debtor Withotit
unduly harming the creditor. Such a torornon law right of redemption
was provided under the Uniform Conditional Sales Act (U.C.S.A.) 8 1
This procedure would eliminate requiring the debtor to rely on a
court of equity to determine if the default was due to an accident Or
Mistake, or if the creditor acted unreasonably.
II. ACCELERATION CLAUSES UNDER THE UNIFORM
CONDITIONAL SALES Act
The proVision of the U.C.S.A.' most concerned with acceleration
clauses was section 16,33 which allowed the creditor-seller to retake
the goods either when the buyer defaulted or when some other
condition existed which the parties agreed would give rise to the
right to retake. Thus, default type acceleration clauses were ex-
pressly allowed under the U.C.S.A.34 However, the U.C.S.A. and
the courts were silent as to the validity of an insecurity type accelera-
tion clause. Since the common law applied to those situations not
statutorily provided for,°° security type acceleration clauses were im-
pliedly allowed under the U.C.S.A.86 The creditor was also alloWed to
29 Graf v. Hope Bldg. Corp., 254 N.Y. 1, 7, 171 N.E; 884, 886 (1930) (Cardozo, J.,
dissenting). There is also some support for the proposition that the buyer has a right to
redemption, which is exercised by paying the entire amount due after a default and re-
possession. Liver v. Mills, 155 Cal. 459, 462, 101 P. 299, 300 (1909); Miller v. Stein, 30
Cal. 402, 407 (1866).
38
 In Miller v. Stein, 30 Cal. 402, 407 (1866); Liver v. Mills, 155 Cal. 459, 462, 101
P. 299, 300 (1909) (dictum).
31
 See pp. 536-37 infra. All references to the Uniform Conditional Sales Act [herein-
after cited as U.S.C.A.] may be found in 2 U.LA. (H. Greene ed. 1922).
22
 The U.C.S.A. was adopted in 14 jurisdictions: Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Hawaii,
Indiana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Panama Canal Zone, Pennsylvania,
South Dakota, Virgin Islands, West Virginia, Wisconsin. 2 U.L.A. 9 (Supp. 1967).
33 	§ 16 provides:
When the buyer shall be in default in the payment of any sum due under
the contract, or in the performance of any other condition which the contract
requires him to perform in order to obtain the property in the goods, or in the
performance of any promise the breach of which is by the contract expressly
Made a ground for the retaking of the goods, the seller may retake possession
thereof . . . .
34 Contra, Harlee v. Federal Fin. Corp., 34 Del. 345, 354, 152 A. 596, 600 (1930),
which , ignored § 16 in holding that the U.C.S.A. invalidated acceleration clauses.
85 U.C.S.A. § 29 provides that "(lin any case not proVided for in this act the rules
of la* and equity shall continue to apply to conditional sales."
20
 G. Bogert, Commentaries on Conditional Sales, in 2 U.L.A. § 101 (Stipp. 1959).
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retake when there was no acceleration clause in the contract. The
implied right to retake arose when the buyer was in default of any
payment or in default of any performance under contract which was
necessary to pass title to the buyer. Dean Bogert, one of the drafters
of the U.C.S.A., stated in his commentary on the Act that this implied
right to retake also arose where the breach was of such importance
as to threaten the seller's security." Since creating a feeling of in-
security is not a breach of a contract term, there would have been
no implied right of acceleration in such an instance. The theoretical
basis of this right was that, under conditional sales law, title to the
goods remained in the seller until the buyer had fully performed,"
and that title carried with it the right of possession."
Sections 17 and 18 of the U.C.S.A.4° imposed some limitations
on acceleration clauses and the right to retake. The buyer had the
right to redeem the collateral only if the seller failed to provide notice
to the buyer 20 to 40 days prior to retaking the goods. In such a case
the buyer had a non-waivable right to redeem the goods for ten days
after repossession 4 1
 The drafters proceeded on the theory that a con-
ditional sale was equivalent to a chattel mortgage and should therefore
have attached to it the equivalent of a right of redemption. They felt
37
 2A U.L.A. § 102.
38
 S. Eager, The Law of Chattel Mortgages and Conditional Sales and Trust Re-
ceipts § 301 (1941).
39
 Liver v. Mills, 155 Cal. 459, 460, 101 P. 299, 300 (1909).
49 	§ 17 provides:
Not more than forty nor Iess than twenty days prior to retaking, the seller,
if he so desires, may serve upon the buyer . . . notice of intention to retake the
goods on account of the buyer's default . . . . If the notice is so served and the
buyer does not perform the obligations in which he has made default before
the day set for retaking, the seller may retake . . . but without any right of
redemption.
U.C.S.A. § 18 provides:
If the seller does not give notice of his intention to retake described in
section 17, he shall retain the goods for ten days . . . during which period the
buyer, upon payment or tender of amount due under the contract at time of
retaking and interest, or upon performance or tender of performance of such
other condition as may be named in the contract as precedent to passage of the
property in goods, or performance or upon tender of performance or any other
promise for the breach of which goods were retaken, upon payment of the ex-
penses of retaking, keeping and storing may redeem goods and become entitled
to take possession of them and to continue in performance of the contract as if
no default had occurred ... If the goods are perishable . . . the provisions of
this section shall not apply, and the seller may resell the goods immediately
upon the retaking.
A retaking by the seller within 4 months of the buyer's bankruptcy was not a voidable
preference under the bankruptcy acts. Thomas Roberts & Co. v. Robinson, 141 Md. 37,
118 A. 198 (1922).
Al U.C.S.A. § 26 provides:
No act or agreement of the buyer before or at the time of the making of the
contract, nor any agreement or statement by the buyer in such contract, shall
constitute a valid waiver of the provisions of Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 25 ..
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that default should not be final because it may be due to a mistake of
the debtor or to causes beyond his control."
However, the statute did not clearly indicate whether the buyer
had to tender the full amount of the contract plus interest and ex-
penses, or merely the amount by which he was in default, in order to
redeem the collateral. Courts have held that payment or tender of
the amount by which the debtor is in default is all that is required."
In so holding these courts rejected the contention that an acceleration
clause in a contract is a waiver of this right of redemption in section
18.44
Justification for acceleration was dependent upon the type of
acceleration clause contained in the contract. If the clause was of the
default type, justification depended, as under common law, upon its
wording. There was usually little problem where the clause enum-
erated the conditions which constituted a default, for justification then
depended upon the occurrence of a specific act. If the clause per-
mitted acceleration when the creditor deemed himself insecure, courts
were divided as to the standard for determining whether the creditor's
insecurity was justified. Some courts adopted a subjective test whereby
the creditor was the sole judge of whether the security was endan-
gered, and no proof was needed beyond the fact that he had actually
deemed himself unsafe and proceeded upon that belief.4 '5 Other courts
applied a completely objective test, and required that the insecurity
rest in "facts of actual ultimate existence, disregarding appearances,
however indicative of probable cause the appearances may be."" The
best and most prevalent approach is where the courts applied the
reasonable man test, and considered whether under all facts and cir-
cumstances a prudent man would have deemed himself insecure. 47
Such circumstances usually included changes in the debtor's financial
situation and deterioration of the state of the collateral.
The burden of proof also depended upon the type of acceleration
clause. In a default type clause, where the creditor accelerated and
repossessed upon an alleged default of the debtor, the debtor would
bring suit for conversion against the creditor and would therefore have
to prove that the alleged default in fact had not occurred, or that such a
default was not provided for in the acceleration clause. In this case
good faith was irrelevant. However if the acceleration was occasioned
42 2A U.L.A. 113.
43 Harlee v. Federal Fin. Corp., 34 Del. 345, 351-52, 152 A. 596, 599 (1930); Street
v. Commercial Credit Co., 35 Ariz. 479, 487-88, 281 P. 46, 49 (1929). See also Annot., 67
ALR 1554 (1930). These courts construe the words "amount due under the contract at
time of retaking" in the light of the words "upon performance or tender of performance
of any other promise for the breach of which goods were retaken" to mean the amount
due under the contract absent an acceleration clause, i.e., the unpaid installments.
44 Harlee v. Federal Fin. Corp., 34 Del. 345, 352, 152 A. 596, 600 (1930).
43 Commercial Credit Co. v. Cain, 190 Miss. 866, 871, 1 So. 2d 776, 777 (1941).
40 Id.
47 Id.; Jacksonville Tractor Co. v. Nasworthy, 114 So. 2d 463, 465 (Fla. 1959). See
also S. Eager, supra note 38, § 176.
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by the creditor's insecurity, there was confusion as to who had the
burden of proof. In jurisdictions which followed the reasonable man
test as a justification for acceleration, the courts placed the burden
of proof on the creditor, the one who exercised the contractual prerog-
ative, and required him to present facts which would justify ac-
celeration by a reasonable man." In jurisdictions which applied the
subjective good faith test, the burden of proof was on the person at-
tacking the operation of the acceleration clause, the debtor, to show
that the creditor acted in bad faith." These courts proceeded on the
theory that this type of acceleration clause was for the benefit of the
creditor, and authorized the creditor to take advantage of it when he
deemed it necessary to protect the collateral. If the creditor con-
sidered the collateral insecure, then the presumption would arise that
such was the fact."
While the U.C.S.A. protected a defaulting debtor by providing a
right of redemption for ten days after a retaking," its provisions
regulating resale of the collateral by a foreclosure sale" were criticized
as being too rigid." The debtor could require the creditor to resell
the collateral," and in so doing the creditor bad to comply with certain
safeguards or lose the right to a deficiency judgment." The U.C.S.A.
provisions regarding disposal of collateral were only partially effective,
since in practice the debtor often would allow the creditor to retake
without exercising his right of redemption, hoping that when the cred-
itor sold the collateral at a foreclosure sale he would violate one of the
technical safeguards. This violation would then bar a deficiency judg-
ment by the creditor, and could even give the buyer a cause of action
for damages."
The drafters of Article 9 of the Code rejected the technical safe-
48 Jacksonville Tractor Co. v. Nasworthy, 114 So. 2d 463, 465 (Fla. 1959). But see
S. Eager, supra note 38, § 176, showing that in New York, a state which adopted the
U.C.S.A., the chattel mortgagor, or the debtor, had the burden of proving bad faith or
unreasonableness.
45 Stage v. Van Leuven, 77 App. Div. 646, 78 N.Y.S. 960, 960-61 (1902).
55 Smith v. Post, 1 Hun 516, 518 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1874).
51 U.C.S.A. § 18.
U.C.S.A. § 19 requires that the sale take place within 30 days of retaking, that the
buyer be afforded 10 days written or personal notice of the sale, that 3 notices of the
sale be posted within the billing district where the sale is to take place and that the sale
be in a public auction in the state of the retaking.
53 Gilmore § 43.1.
54 	§ 20.
55
 Gilmore § 44.9.4 & n. 5.
58 U.C.S.A. § 25 provides:
If the seller fails to comply with the provisions of Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and
23 after retaking the goods, the buyer may recover from the seller his actual
damages, if any, and in no event less than one third of the sum of all payments
which have been made under the contract, with interest.
As originally framed the section would have provided for the recovery of all of the part
payments. 2A U.L.A. § 129. This would have worked an even greater injustice on good
faith creditors, for then the debtor could in all probability not only avoid a deficiency
judgment but also recover any payments made under the contract.
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guards imposed on a foreclosure sale by the U.C.S.A. 57 Under Article
9 the debtor may require the creditor to dispose of the collateral,"
but the Code avoids the unjust situation which arose under the
U.C.S.A. by merely requiring the sale to be "commercially reason-
able."59
III. ACCELERATION CLAUSES UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
Clauses which allow acceleration on the occasion of the insecurity
of the creditor are expressly allowed under Section 1-20S of the Code.
Section 1-208 is not concerned with default type acceleration clauses.
The Code implicitly allows a default type acceleration clause since
on default a secured party has the right to repossession of the col-
lateral without judicial intervention;" the creditor need only enumerate
the occasions of default within the contract.
Section 1-208 adopts a good faith standard in order to determine
whether the occasion of the creditor's insecurity was justified. The
section provides that when the contract allows a party to accelerate
"at will," or "when he deems himself insecure," the party must in
good faith believe that the prospect for payment is impaired. Like
the common law rule," but unlike the reasonable man test of the
U.C.S.A.," the Code merely requires that the creditor be "honest in
fact.' This preference for the more subjective standard rather than
the reasonable man test allows the creditor to be the sole judge of
whether the security is endangered; his honest belief is the only
prerequisite for acceleration and it need not be supported by objective
facts."
57 Gilmore §§ 43.1, 43.2.
58 U.C.C. § 9 -505 (2)
U.C.C. § 9-504(3).
80
 U.C.C.. § 9-503 provides that "[u]nless otherwise agreed a secured party has on
default the right to take possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party
may proceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace or
may proceed by action . . ."
61 See p. 533 supra.
62
 See p. 537 supra.
U.C.C. § 1-201(19) defines "good faith" as "honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction concerned."
64 Only six cases have cited § 1-208. In Sheppard Fed. Credit Union v. Palmer, 408
F.2d 1369 (5th Cir. 1969), the court held that the trial court was in error in instructing
the jury that the burden of proof was on the creditor to show that he acted in good
faith. Id. at 1371. The court also stated that mere error by the creditor as to a debtor's
security is insufficient to establish bad faith. Id. at 1373. Fort Knox Nat'l Bank v. Gus-
tafson, 385 S.W.2d 196, 200 (Ky. 1964), held that the issue of the creditor's good faith
must go to the jury unless the evidence relating to it is no more than a scintilla. Seay v.
Davis, 246 Ark. 193, 438 S.W.2d 479, 481 (1969), held that the creditor acted in bad
faith in accelerating where assurances were given that payment would be made within
three hours after the debtor's default. Merchant v. Worley, 79 N.M. 771, 774, 449 P.2d
787, 790 (1969), held that the debtor has the burden of proving the creditor's bad faith.
539
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
The Code's adoption of "the pure heart and empty head""
approach, which was a minority view under the U.C.S.A.," is sub-
ject to abuse because it is too subjective and arbitrary. This test
allows the creditor to be unreasonable, since as long as the creditor is
honest he is protected by the literal wording of the Code. It puts the
debtor in an unjust position since the creditor may at any time call
in the entire debt. 87 This is especially true in light of the Code's al-
location of the burden of proof.
Under the Code the debtor has the "burden of establishing" the
creditor's lack of good faith under an insecurity type clause. 08 Where a
creditor retakes the collateral upon a debtor's default pursuant to
section 9-503, the burden of proof is also on the debtor. Since the
creditor retakes and the debtor must bring suit for conversion, the
burden of proof falls on the debtor to prove that in fact no default
occurred.
The Code defines "burden of establishing" as the "burden of
persuading the triers of fact that the existence of the fact is more
probable that its non-existence."" The cases which have construed
section 1-208 unsuccessfully attempted to alleviate the burden placed on
the debtor. Thus, one court construed this burden to require "submis-
sion to the jury of the issue of good faith unless the evidence relating to
it is no more than a scintilla, or lacks probative value having fitness to
induce conviction in the minds of reasonable men." 7° At least one other
court was bound unwillingly by this provision, and said that it was "not
at liberty to accept or reject the legislative policy of the state.""
The Code's allocation upon the debtor of the burden of proving
the creditor's bad faith is clearly unreasonable. This burden is prac-
tically impossible to meet unless the creditor outwardly manifests bad
faith, since the debtor is unable to probe the mind of the creditor to
establish his intention. Thus, the Code in effect allows a creditor to
destroy a possible viable contractual relationship without requiring
Fay v. Marina Inc., 6 UCC Rep. Serv. 516 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969), which held that
§ 1-208 was inapplicable to a default type acceleration clause.
08 The Code's definition of "good faith" is an exemplification of the subjective
test of honesty in fact which is sometimes referred to as the rule of "the pure
heart and empty head." This subjective test relates back more than one hundred
years in the law of negotiable instruments to the case of Gill v. Cupitt and is an
abandonment of the objective standard of reasonable prudence there enunciated.
Note, supra note 15, at 756.
66 Jacksonville Tractor Co. v. Nasworthy, 114 So. 2d 463, 465 (Fla. 1958). See
p. 537 supra.
07
 In 14 Sw. L.J. 516, 518 (1960), the commentator concluded that a good faith
determination is not sufficient to protect stable debtors.
68 U.C.C. § 1-208.
09 U.C.C. § 1-201(8). For a general criticism of the Code's method of presenting
evidence, see Bigham, Presumptions, Burden of Proof and the Uniform Commercial Code,
21 Vand. L. Rev. 177 (1968).
70
 Fort Knox Nat'l Bank v. Gustafson, 385 S.W.2d 196, 200 (Ky. 1964).
71 Sheppard Fed. Credit Union v. Palmer, 408 F.2d 1369, 1372 (5th Cir. 1969).
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him to justify his actions. For these reasons the courts prior to the
Code placed the burden of proving good faith upon the creditor."
Once the creditor has legitimately accelerated under the Code,
Article 9 determines the rights of the debtor and creditor. Section
9-506" gives a debtor a right to redeem the collateral at any time be-
fore the creditor has disposed of it by "tendering fulfillment of all
obligations." The Comment to section 9-506 provides that if the agree-
ment contains an acceleration clause which expressly makes the entire
balance due on the default of one installment, the debtor may redeem
only by tendering the entire balance. 74
Where the debtor fails to redeem the collateral, the question
arises as to the procedure allowed by the Code for disposing of the
collateral. The drafters rejected the strict procedure of the U.C.S.A.
and chose to follow Section 6.3 of the Uniform Trusts Receipts Act,"
which provided broad guidelines allowing the marketplace to most
72
 Jacksonville Tractor Co. v. Nasworthy, 114 So. 2d 463, 465 (Fla. 1959). Com-
mercial Credit Co. v. Cain, 190 Miss. 866, 871, 1 So. 2d 776, 777 (1941).
73 U.C.C. § 9-506 provides:
At any time before the secured party has disposed of collateral or entered into a
contract for its disposition under Section 9-504 or before the obligation has been
discharged under Section 9-505(2) the debtor or any other secured party may
unless otherwise agreed in writing after default redeem the collateral by tender-
ing fulfillment of all obligations secured by the collateral as well as the expenses
reasonably incurred by the secured party in retaking, holding and preparing the
collateral for disposition, in arranging for the sale, and to the extent provided in
the agreement and not prohibited by law, his reasonable attorney's fees and legal
expenses.
74 U.C.C. 9-506, Comment. No case has construed what the debtor must do to
redeem where the agreement does not contain an acceleration clause; thus, the debtor's
requirement for redemption is unclear. By negative implication, in such a case the debtor
may redeem by paying only the missed installment. But if the debtor fails to redeem,
the question arises as to what the debtor owes the creditor—the missed payment or the
entire balance. If the debtor merely owes the missed installment when the collateral
is sold, the proceeds over and beyond the missed installments would have to be paid to
the debtor, thus leaving the balance of the contract unsecured. This situation is com-
pletely unacceptable, and if the courts followed such a course few creditors would re-
possess and even fewer debtors would redeem the collateral. See Gilmore § 43.5.
75 Gilmore § 44.2. The Uniform Trust Receipts Act § 6.3 provides:
(a) After possession taken, the entruster shall, subject to subdivision (b)
and Subsection 5, hold such goods, documents or instruments with the rights and
duties of a pledgee.
(b) Art entruster in possession may, on or after default, give notice to the
trustee of intention to sell, and may, not less than five days after the serving or
sending of such notice, sell the goods, documents or instruments for the trustee's
account at public or private sale, and may at a public sale himself become a
purchaser. The proceeds of any such sale, whether public or private, shall be
applied (i) to the payment of the expenses thereof, (ii) to the payment of the
expenses of retaking, keeping and storing the goods, documents or instruments,
(iii) to the satisfaction of the trustee's indebtedness. The trustee shall receive any
surplus and shall be liable to the entruster for any deficiency. Notice of sale shall
be deemed sufficiently given if in writing, and either (i) personally served on the
trustee, or (ii) sent by postpaid ordinary mail to the trustee's last known bus-
iness address.
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effectively and fairly dispose of collateral in order to satisfy the ob-
ligation. The only requirement was that the disposition be "com-
mercially reasonable."" To protect the consumers' interest in sales
transactions, the drafters relied on the local Retail Installment Sales
Act." Professor Gilmore states:
In some Code states the default provisions of the Re-
tail Installment Sales Act have been repealed with the enact-
ment of the Code or amended to mesh with Article 9 default
provisions. In states where that has not been done, the
default provisions of the local RISA will prevail over the
Article 9 provisions by virtue of the saving clause in section
9-203(2).78
There are several provisions of the Code which alleviate the
burden placed on the debtor. Courts have applied Article 2 to trans-
actions which involve elements of sales and secured transactions."
Section 2-302 80 permits the courts to refuse enforcement of a contract
or term which is found to be unconscionable. Thus, if an acceleration
clause is so one-sided as to be unreasonable, the debtor may have a
remedy under section 2-302. Since section 1-208 expressly validates
clauses which permit acceleration at will or when the creditor feels
insecure, the mere existence of such a clause would not be evidence
of unconscionability. Section 2-302 may be applicable where a clause
provides a right of acceleration arising out of an enumerated trivial
occasion. Another provision which may alleviate the burden upon the
debtor under section 1-208 is section 2-103 (1) (b)," which imposes
78 U.C.C. 9-504(3) provides:
Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceedings and
may be made by way of one or more contracts. Sale or other disposition may
be as a unit or in parcels and at any time and place and on any terms but every
aspect of the disposition . . . must be commercially reasonable. Unless collateral
is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily
sold on a recognized market, reasonable notification of the time and place of any
public sale or reasonable notification of the time after which any private sale
or other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured party
to the debtor. . . The secured party may buy at any public sale and if the
collateral is of a type customarily sold in a recognized market or is of a type
which is the subject of widely distributed standard price quotations he may buy
at private sale.
77 Gilmore § 43.1.
78
 Id.
79 See Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A,2d 405 (1967), discussed in Comment, Un-
conscionable Security Agreements: Application of Section 2-302 to Article 9, 11 B.C.
Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 128 (1969).
8° U.C.C. § 2-302(1) provides:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the con-
tract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse
to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without
the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscion-
able clause so as to avoid any unconscionable result.
81 U.C.C. § 2-103(1) (b) defines "good faith" in the case of a merchant as meaning
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the general obligations of honesty in fact and the observance of rea-
sonable commercial standards in contracts under Article 2. Thus,
if the creditor is a "merchant" under section 2-104(1)" an objective
standard must be met in order to justify acceleration.
While the above provisions may be beneficial to the debtor, the
Code could be revised in order to further protect the debtor from
arbitrary acceleration. Section 1-208 could be rewritten to provide a
reasonable man test as a standard for justifying acceleration at will or
when the creditor feels insecure. This would be similar to the tests
provided under the common law and the U.C.S.A. The burden of
proof should be shifted to the creditor since he is the party who
feels "insecure" and is in the best position to present evidence to
establish the reasonableness of this alleged "insecurity." However,
where the clause allows acceleration when the debtor defaults, the
burden of proof should remain on the debtor.
The Code should also be modified so as to include a right of
redemption by payment of the amount by which the debtor is in de-
fault. Thus, a provision similar to the ten-day period provided by
the U.C.S.A. during which the debtor could redeem the collateral by
tender of missed payments should be included in Article 9. It should
also be specified that if the debtor does not redeem, the creditor may
satisfy the entire balance due under the contract. Where the collateral
consists of perishable goods or the contract specifically provides that
"time is of the essence," the debtor's right to redeem should be for a
reasonable period up to ten days. In a suit by the debtor for con-
version where the debtor claims that the creditor has resold the
goods before the ten-day redemption period has expired, the burden
of proof should be on the creditor to establish that his early resale
was reasonable.
CONCLUSION
It is evident that the Code, in attempting to improve on the
U.C.S.A.'s provisions on foreclosure, has removed the basic protection
owed the debtor in order to protect the creditor's right to a deficiency
judgment. The Code places the harsh burden of proving subjective
intent on the party least able to establish it, while providing only a
minimal right of redemption. The Code incorporates the most un-
workable provisions of prior statutory and case law in its attempt to
insulate the creditor. It is submitted that fundamental revisions of
"honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing
in the trade."
82 U.C.C. § 2-104(1) defines "merchant" as:
[A] person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds
himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods in-
volved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed
by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occu-
pation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.
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the Code are necessary to provide balanced protection to both the
debtor and creditor.
FREDERICK P. LEAP
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